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This paper investigates how monetary shocks are transmitted internationally.  It shows 
that where a national currency is used as an international medium of exchange, the 
international money is non-neutral.  In particular, an increase in the supply of 
international money leads to a transfer of real resources to the international money-
issuing country from its trading partner.  It induces an expansion of the non-tradable 
sector in the international money-issuing country, and an expansion the tradable sector in 
its trading partner.  The real impact of a monetary shock is greater under a fixed 
exchange rate system than under a flexible exchange rate system. 
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 International Transmission of Monetary Shocks in a Ricardian World 
 
1. Introduction 
What is the mechanism through which monetary policy decisions affect output and 
prices?  This is a perennial question that has generated a large literature offering different 
perspectives.  According to standard textbooks, monetary policy affects short-term 
interest rates, which in turn affect investment and consumption decisions.   Extending this 
standard position, the lending view observes that given information asymmetry and other 
frictions in credit markets, a monetary policy that raises (lowers) market interest rates 
tends to raise (lower) the external finance premium (which is the difference between the 
costs of external and internal finance), thereby amplifying the impact on borrowing 
(Bernanke & Gertler, 1995).   In contrast, the monetarist’s view contends that a monetary 
impulse, by changing the stock of money, changes the marginal utility of money relative 
to other goods and assets.  To restore equilibrium, money holders adjust their spending 
and asset portfolios.  Therefore, apart from the impact on interest rates, monetary shocks 
can directly influence consumer decisions  (Meltzer, 1995).    
 
In an increasingly globalised economy and in light of the recent global financial turmoil 
and subsequent stabilising policies implemented by various governments, it is timely to 
extend the traditional question and ask whether monetary policies in one country can 
affect output and prices of its trading partners and if so, through what mechanism.  There 
is an extensive empirical literature that studies the international monetary transmission 
mechanism by examining movements of financial market prices including the exchange 
rates ((Taylor, 1995).  However, to our knowledge, few theoretical studies have explicitly 
modelled the international transmission of monetary policy impulses through their impact 
on international trade.   This is probably due to the fact that most trade models deal with 
“barter” rather than “monetary” transactions.  The choice of barter models is reasonable 
because if one accepts the “separability hypothesis” which states that in cases where the 
marginal rate of substitution between goods is independent of the demand for money, the 
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 analyses of the traditional barter models remain valid for monetary models (Anderson & 
Takayama, 1977).  Of those trade models that do incorporate money, most adopt the 
“small country” assumption, and focus on how the small country’s policies such as 
currency devaluation and monetary expansion can affect its own welfare (Kemp, 1982; 
Takayama & Anderson, 1978).   
 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a set of monetary trade models to investigate how 
monetary policy shocks are transmitted internationally.  In particular, we ask (1) how a 
monetary policy change in one country may affect itself and its trading partner; and (2) 
how the transmission mechanisms of monetary shocks may differ under different 
international monetary regimes.    
 
We conduct our investigation in a simple 2-country, 3-good Ricardian framework and 
study the international transmission of monetary shocks under three different regimes.  
We start with a benchmark model of Regime One where two national currencies are used 
in international trade, but there is no demand in one country for holding another country’s 
currency.  In this benchmark model, money is shown to be neutral, which is consistent 
with the findings of the mainstream literature.  
 
In light of the observation that most international trade is mediated by a few currencies, 
of which the US dollar is dominant (Goldberg & Tille, 2008), we develop two other 
models of Regime Two and Regime Three, where only country 2’s national currency is 
used in international trade.  A flexible exchange rate system operates in Regime Two, and 
a fixed exchange rate system operates in Regime Three. 
 
Suppose international trade is mediated by the national currency of country 2.  Since 
country 2’s national currency becomes an international currency, there will be a demand 
for holding it in country 1 as well.  Consequently a change in the supply of the 
international currency will not only affect economic decisions in country 2, but also 
affect those in country 1.  Specifically, an increase in the supply of money in country 2 
3 
 tends to increase the nominal demand for imports from country 1, which in turn increases 
country 1’s nominal income and its demand for country 2’s currency.  As this increased 
demand for country 2’s currency can only be satisfied by increased exports to country 2, 
there must be a transfer of real resources from country 1 to country 2.  The increased 
exports also mean that the tradeable sector in country 1 has to expand at the expense of 
the non-tradable sector; correspondingly the tradable sector contracts in country 2 as 
some of import needs are financed by the newly created money instead of export revenue.  
Therefore in contrast to the benchmark model in which money is neutral, when a national 
currency also serves as an international currency, the international money is no longer 
neutral even in the absence of any price rigidities.  In particular, an increase in the supply 
of international money leads to a real resource transfer to the international money-issuing 
country and structural changes in both countries.  
 
The extent to which an international monetary shock has real effects may be affected by 
exchange rate systems.   Under a flexible exchange rate system, an increase in country 
2’s money supply tends to lower the exchange rate (i.e., the price of country 2’s currency 
in terms of country 1’s currency).  This downward pressure is however partly offset by 
the increased demand for country 2’s currency in country 1; hence the exchange rate does 
not fall to the same extent as the increase in the money supply.   Under a fixed exchange 
rate system, an increase in country 2’s money supply puts downward pressure on the 
exchange rate, which compels country 1’s monetary authority to intervene by buying 
country 2’s currency using its own created money.  The upshot is that both foreign 
exchange reserve and money supply in country 1 go up.  Since the increase in foreign 
exchange reserve also has to be backed by an increase in exports to country 2, the real 
transfer to country 2 is larger, and consequently a greater structural change needs to take 
place under a fixed exchange rate system. 
 
In the following, we develop a set of three models which formalise the above narrative.  
Section 2 presents the benchmark model in which two freely convertible national 
currencies are used in international trade.  Section 3 adapts the benchmark model by 
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 assuming that international trade is mediated by one of the national currencies.  It 
investigates the international transmission mechanism of monetary shocks under a 
flexible exchange rate system and a fixed exchange rate system, respectively.  Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. Regime One: The Benchmark Model  
Consider a Ricardian world with two countries, country 1 with a population of N1, and 
country 2 with a population of N2.  There are three goods, X, Y and Z.  Country 1 
specialises in the production of good X, and country 2 in good Y.  Good Z is non-tradable 
good produced in both countries, and is not traded internationally.  Labor is assumed to 
be immobile between the countries. 
 
International trade between the two countries is meditated by the currencies of both 
countries.  The currencies are freely convertible.  Individual consumers in both countries 
are assumed to derive utility from the consumption of the three goods and from the 
holding of real balances of their own currencies
3 .  The decision problem of a 
representative consumer in country is: 
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where  111 ,, x yz  are quantities of goods X, Y, and Z;  ij p (i=1, 2; j=X, Y, Z) is the price of 
good j in country i, and is denominated in the currency of the country producing the 
good;  is the average price of all three goods in country 1; mPis the demand for  1xyz P 11 / xyz
                                                 
3 If both national currencies are used in international trade, then arguably there should be a demand for 
holding both currencies in both countries.  However, we have chosen the simpler benchmark where there is 
no separate demand in one country for another country’s currency because this seems to be the assumption 
implicit in much of the existing literature, see, for instance, Kemp (1982), Dusansky (1989) and Palivos 
and Yip (1997). 
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 real balances; and e is the exchange rate (i.e., the price of country 2’s currency in terms of 
country 1’s currency). 
 
The decision problem for a representative consumer in country 2 is similar:  
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Solving the decision problems give us the demand functions for goods and real balances 
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(2.2) 
 
On the production side, we assume that all goods are produced with labor only.  The 
production functions are:  
Country 1:   11 1 xx X aL = ;   11 1 zz Z aL =  
Country 2:   ;   22 2 yy Ya L = 22 2 zz Z aL =  
Assuming perfect competition, we obtain the money prices of goods which, in 
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 (2.3) In equilibrium, all markets clear, which means the following conditions are met:  
Labor markets:     11 xz LLN 1 + =  ;  22 yz2 L LN + =       
 (2.4) 
Markets for good Z:     11 1 Nz Z = ;   22 2 Nz Z =          
 (2.5) 
Market for good X:    11 22 1 Nx Nx X + =       
 (2.6) 
Market for good Y:     11 22 2 Ny Ny Y + =           
 (2.7) 
Foreign exchange market:  
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Solving equations (2.1)-(2.8), we obtain the equilibrium exchange rate, wages, prices, 








































































































































































That is, an increase in the supply of country 2’s currency weakens the currency, raises the 
wage rate in country 2 and the prices of goods produced in country 2, but has no impact 
on the wage rate in country 1 or the prices of goods produced in country 1.   
 
Moreover, it is easy to see that the quantities of goods consumed in each country are 
independent of the money supply of either country ( 1 , mm 2 ), which means money is 
neutral.   
To summarize, we have 
 Proposition 1. If both national currencies are used in international trade, and if there is 
no demand in one country for holding another country’s currency, then money is neutral.  
That is, an increase in the supply of one country’s currency leads to a depreciation of 
that currency and raises the nominal wage rate and prices in that country; but has no 
effects on real variables in either country.  
 
3.  International trade mediated by a single national currency 
In the last section, we assume that both currencies are used in international trade, and that 
there is no demand in either country for holding another country’s currency.  This is not, 
in our judgement, a realist assumption.  As mentioned earlier, only a few currencies are 
routinely used in international trade, of which US dollar enjoys a dominant position.  
Consequently in most countries, there is a demand for holding these international 
currencies.  In light of this observation, we assume in this section that international trade 
is mediated by one national currency, namely the currency of country 2.   We also assume 
that since country 2’s currency becomes an international currency, there is a demand in 
country 1 for holding it as well.   
 
3.1. Regime Two: Flexible exchange rates 
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 First consider the case under a flexible exchange rate system.  Since, by assumption, 
there is a demand in country 1 for holding country 2’s currency, the decision problem of 
the representative consumer in country 1 changes to:   
  
111 1 1 1 2 ,,, / , / max
xz y xyzm P F X p
3 12 4 11 1 1
1 1111 111
12 1 2
(,,, , ) ( )( )
xz y xz y
mF X m F X
UU x y z x y z
Pp P p
5 α α αα α ==      
s.t.   1 11 2 1 11 1 1 1 1 () xy z p xp e y p z m F X e w m F X ++ + + = + + e    
   12345 1 α αααα ++++=        
where  is the average price of good X and good Z (which are bought with country 1’s 
own currency); m is the demand for real balances in domestic currency;  is 
the demand for real balances in foreign exchange (the currency of country 2); 
1xz P
11 / xz P 12 / y FX p
1 m and 
1 FX eare initial money holdings in domestic and foreign currency, respectively; e is the 
exchange rate.  
 
The decision problem for individuals in country 2 remains the same as in the benchmark 
model.    Solving the consumer decision problems in both countries, we obtain the 
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9 
 The production side remains unchanged, so we have the same price-wage relationship as 
in the benchmark model (equations (2.3)).   The market clearing conditions for labor and 
goods also remain unchanged (equations (2.4)-(2.7)).  However due to the demand for 
holding foreign exchange in country 1, the clearing condition for the foreign exchange 
market  changes to: 
 
1




NF X py N x N F X
e
+= +           
 (3.4) 
Jointly solving equations (3.1)-(3.4) and (2.3)-(2.7), we obtain the equilibrium values of 
all the endogenous variables, which we discuss below.  
(1) Quantities demanded for foreign exchange holdings and for goods 
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